of the revolution were desirous it should be relished, which is
difficult to compass without good laws. Hence it is that ancient
institutions generally tend to reform the people's manners, and
those of modern date to corrupt them. In the course of a long
administration, the descent to vice is insensible; but there is no
reascending to virtue without making the most generous efforts.

In proportion as luxury gains ground in a republic, the minds of the
people are turned towards their particular interests. Those who are
allowed only what is necessary have nothing but their own
reputation and their country's glory in view. But a soul depraved
by luxury has many other desires, and soon becomes an enemy to
the laws that confine it.

2. *Of the Corruption of the Principles of Democracy.* The principle
democracy is corrupted not only when the spirit of equality is
extinct, but likewise when they fall into a spirit of extreme
equality, and when each citizen would fain be upon a level with
those whom he has chosen to command him. Then the people,
incapable of bearing the very power they have delegated, want to
manage everything themselves, to debate for the senate, to execute
for the magistrate, and to decide for the judges.
When this is the case, virtue can no longer subsist in the republic.
The people are desirous of exercising the functions of the
magistrates, who cease to be revered. The deliberations of the
senate are slighted; all respect is then laid aside for the senators,
and consequently for old age. If there is no more respect for old
age, there will be none presently for parents; deference to husbands
will be likewise thrown off, and submission to masters. This
licence will soon become general, and the trouble of command be
as fatiguing as that of obedience. Wives, children, slaves will
shake off all subjection. No longer will there be any such thing as
manners, order, or virtue.
We find in Xenophon's *Banquet* a very lively description of a
republic in which the people abused their equality. Each guest
gives in his turn the reason why he is satisfied. "Content I am," says Chamides, "because of my poverty. When I was rich, I was obliged to pay my court to informers; knowing I was more liable to be hurt by them than capable of doing them harm. The republic constantly demanded some new tax of me; and I could not decline paying. Since I have grown poor, I have acquired authority; nobody threatens me; I rather threaten others. I can go or stay where I please. The rich already rise from their seats and give me the way. I am a king, I was before a slave: I paid taxes to the republic, now it maintains me: I am no longer afraid of losing: but I hope to acquire."

The people fall into this misfortune when those in whom they confide, desirous of concealing their own corruption, endeavour to corrupt them. To disguise their own ambition, they speak to them only of the grandeur of the state; to conceal their own avarice, they incessantly flatter theirs.

The corruption will increase among the corruptors, and likewise among those who are already corrupted. The people will divide the public money among themselves, and, having added the administration of affairs to their indolence, will be for blending their poverty with the amusements of luxury. But with their indolence and luxury, nothing but the public treasure will be able to satisfy their demands.

We must not be surprised to see their suffrages given for money. It is impossible to make great largesses to the people without great extortion: and to compass this, the state must be subverted. The greater the advantages they seem to derive from their liberty, the nearer they approach towards the critical moment of losing it. Petty tyrants arise who have all the vices of a single tyrant. The small remains of liberty soon become insupportable; a single tyrant starts up, and the people are stripped of everything, even of the profits of their corruption. Democracy has, therefore, two excesses to avoid - the spirit of inequality, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the spirit of extreme equality, which leads to despotic power, as the latter is completed by conquest. True it is that those who
corrupted the Greek republics did not always become tyrants. This was because they had a greater passion for eloquence than for the military art. Besides there reigned an implacable hatred in the breasts of the Greeks against those who subverted a republican government; and for this reason anarchy degenerated into annihilation, instead of being changed into tyranny.

When once a republic is corrupted, there is no possibility of remedying any of the growing evils, but by removing the corruption and restoring its lost principles; every other correction is either useless or a new evil. While Rome preserved her principles entire, the judicial power might without any abuse be lodged in the hands of senators; but as soon as this city became corrupt, to whatsoever body that power was transferred, whether to the senate, to the knights, to the treasurers, to two of those bodies, to all three together, or to any other, matters still went wrong. The knights had no more virtue than the senate, the treasurers no more than the knights, and these as little as the centurions. After the people of Rome had obtained the privilege of sharing the magistracy with the patricians, it was natural to think that their flatterers would immediately become arbiters of the government. But no such thing ever happened.